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Abstract
Over the past decades financial investment of non-financial businesses has been rising and
accumulation of capital goods has been declining. The first part of the paper offers a novel
theory to explain this phenomenon. Financialization, the shareholder revolution and the
development of a market for corporate control have shifted power to shareholders and thus
changed management priorities, leading to a reduction in the desired growth rate. In the second
part the link between accumulation and financialization is tested econometrically by means of a
time series analysis of aggregate business investment for USA, UK, France, and Germany.
Extensive test of robustness are performed. For the first three countries evidence that confirms
the negative effect of financialization on accumulation is found.
Acknowledgements
The paper has benefited from comments by Özlem Onaran, Christian Ragacs and Dieter
Gstach. All remaining mistakes are mine.
Keywords




The past decades have witnessed at the same time a rise in investments in financial assets and a
slowdown of accumulation of physical assets. Some economists, and even more political
activists, have argued that there is a structural link between the two phenomena: financial
investment is replacing physical investment. However, most economists remain unconvinced.
Financial investment is a transfer of assets, not a use of income. Buying stocks transfers
liquidity to other economic actors, possibly from firms with bad investment opportunities to
ones with good opportunities. Thus macroeconomically financial investment cannot substitute
for physical investment (e.g. Tobin 1997).
This paper has two aims. First we present a novel theory of how financialization, via a change
in management priorities, may affect desired growth rates. Second, the link between
accumulation and rentiers income, i.e. income from financial assets and transactions, is tested
econometrically.
Financialization is a recent term to capture transformations within the financial sector as well
as in the relation between the financial sector and other economic sectors. There is no agreed
upon definition since it includes phenomena ranging form the globalisation of financial markets,
the shareholder value revolution and the rise of incomes from financial investment (see Arrighi
1994, Chesnais 1997, various papers in the special issue of Economy and Society 2000, and
Dumenil and Levy 2000 as important contributions). For the purpose of this paper we define
financialization as the increased activity of non-financial businesses on financial markets and
measure it by the corresponding income streams. The paper will argue that the process of
financialization is linked to changes in the internal power structure of the firm. We base our
analysis on a post-Keynesian
1
 theory of the firm, distinguishing between workers, management
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 We use post-Keynesian theory in an inclusive sense, implying that it can potentially integrate various streams
of heterodox economics. In this sense we are closer to Lavoie (1992) than to Davidson (1994). Davidson bases
his post-Keynesian approach on fundamental uncertainty and non-ergodicity, whereas Lavoie integrates a rich
variety of heterodox economics. Such an attempt of integration raises the issue of consistency and Lavoie
attempts to provide a consistent framework. While we applaud his seminal presentation that is successful in
combining post-Keynesian micro- and macroeconomics, we are not fully satisfied with the degree of theoretical
consistency he offers. In particular, there is a strong asymmetry in that Lavoie borrows heavily from
institutional economics in his theory of the firm and from Marxists in the theory of accumulation. If we are
serious about the integration of different approaches, classes have to matter in the firm and institutions for
accumulation.4
and rentiers (shareholders). The "managerial capitalism" of the post-war era was characterised
by relatively autonomous management that had a certain preference for growth (as opposed to
profits). Through the shareholder revolution, its interests got realigned with those of
shareholders, who have a stronger preference for profits, as opposed to growth. If the firm
faces a growth-profit trade off, than such a change will lead to lower investment on the firm
level. The theoretical parts of the paper elaborate this argument and its empirical parts test the
influence of financialization of aggregate business investment econometrically.
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 discusses the class structure of the firm. Section 3
summarises the post-Keynesian theory of the firm and argues that it is bound to the specific
period of managerial capitalism. Section 4 extends the theory to the context of financialization.
Section 5 presents the econometric specification that the theoretical discussion leads to.
Section 6 discusses data sources and econometric issues. Section 7 presents the results of the
econometric study, with particular emphasis on the robustness of the results. Section 8
interprets the findings and compares them with previous findings in the mainstream as well as
in the post-Keynesian tradition. Section 9 offers calculations to assess the contribution of
financialization to the slowdown of accumulation. Section 10 concludes.
2. Class analysis
Classes, or preferably class positions, can be defined with respect to the type of income
received, the role in the production process and the political process. We will focus on the first
dimension and merely note the other two dimensions briefly. With respect to types of income,
we distinguish three income classes: recipients of wages, recipients of profits and recipients of
interest payments, dividends and rents. To these income categories three social categories
correspond: workers, (industrial) capitalists and rentiers. In the production process capitalists
wield power, as they control and organise production, whereas workers perform the work.
Rentiers, as absentee owners, play no role in the production process, but provide the initial
finance to start the business and receive part of the surplus as distributed profits.
2
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 Dividends and interest payment, of course, are paid out of profits. Therefore capitalists and rentiers may be
considered part of the same class. However, they occupy different positions within the production process and,
as we will argue in section 3, they have different interests. Hence we regard the distinction between (industrial)
capitalists and rentiers as important—even if it is an intra-class distinction.5
The distinction of income classes goes back to the classical economists and can also be found
in Keynes (1971), who distinguished between the "earners", "the business class" and
"investors" respectively, and has proven fruitful since. Recent examples of applications of three
class models include Epstein (1994) and Dutt (1992).
Note that we have defined class with respect to a type of income received. Therefore, any
individual and even groups of individuals will occupy multiple class positions if they receive
different types of income (as most people in fact do) (this fact is well known and debated
among Marxists, e.g. Resnick and Wolff 1986, Wright 1985). Moreover, the "industrial
capitalist" is an abstract category that, at least in modern capitalism, does not exist as such.
The capitalist is defined by virtue of receiving profit income, part of which will be distributed
as dividends or interest payments to rentiers. Any real life capitalist will therefore have a
double position as the capitalist during the day making decisions concerning the firm, and as
rentier in the evening and on weekends living of the income distributed to the owner of the
firm.
The classification becomes even more complex for modern day managers, who take the role of
capitalists in terms of exerting power in the firm and making decisions e.g. concerning
investment expenditures, but typically receive wage income and, more importantly now,
receive rentiers income, often in the form of stock options. Managers therefore have multiple,
at times even contradictory, class positions. Their interests and preferences hence depend
strongly on the institutional setting of the economy, or more specifically the firm.
3. The post-Keynesian theory of the firm
What distinguishes the post-Keynesian approach to the firm from the simple version of the
neo-classical approach is that the goal of the firm is not simply taken to be profit maximisation.
This is a difference that may disappear in more sophisticated neo-classical models. The entire
argument presented here can be reformulated in a neo-classical model, i.e. assuming utility
maximising individuals. Our presentation will proceed along these lines.6
Post-Keynesians are readily willing to accept that there are more goals to a capitalist firm than
the maximisation of profits: the growth of the firm, the expansion of its market share, exerting
power over its workers or suppliers and so on. The specific goal, or the weight of these goals,
will depend on the specific institutional setting of the firm and the economy.
3
 In contemporary
capitalism the pursuit of growth is regarded as the major aim of firms, which stems from the
analysis of managerial capitalism.
Developed by Galbraith (1967) and Eichner (1976), and summarized neatly by Lavoie (1992),
post-Keynesians have a well elaborated theory of the firm in the age of managerial capitalism,
but have done little to adapt this theory to contemporary changes in corporate governance. We
will propose a way to do so in the next section. Here we will review the theory of the
managerial firm and point out its shortcomings.
The centrepiece of the theory is the separation between ownership and control. Management
has objectives distinct from the absentee owners. While the latter are primarily interested in
dividends and share prices, the former aspire power and prestige, that might be expressed in
high market share and fast growth, luxurious offices and many subordinates. Due to various
laws and an asymmetry in information about what exactly is going on in the firm and how to
run it, management has the upper hand. As a consequence: "The objective of growth, rather
than the consumption of profit, is predominant." (Lavoie 1992, 104).
It is important to note that such an institutional arrangement is historically specific to the post-
war era. Doing some violence to actual historical complexity, we can say, that in the early 19
th
century many firms were owner controlled, a situation which had changed by the late 19
th
century when a wave of mergers lead to a consolidation of industry. In the course of this
development two groups of actors emerged as important: financial capitalists and management.
The financial sector gained a crucial position in financing the mergers and the time of the turn
of the century has also been labelled "financial capitalism". Salaried managers now ran these
giant firms, giving rise to what Chandler (1977) called "managerial capitalism". After the crises
of the 1930s, governments severely restricted the influence of the financial sector, thereby
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 However, the urge to grow and the quest for survival are often equated and take a somewhat more
fundamental place in the literature (e.g. Robinson 1962).7
fortifying the position of management. "Money managers refrained from sitting on boards; and
bankers, fearing liabilities, remained aloof from the governance affairs of companies to which
they had loaned money. Investment bankers found that they could make plenty of money
arranging transactions, while avoiding the liabilities and opprobrium associated with financial
control of corporations" (Baker and Smith 1998, 8)
Analysts of managerial capitalism (e.g. Chandler), post-Keynesians (Galbraith, Eichner) and
proponents of shareholder value (Baker and Smith) agree on the broad characteristics of
managerial capitalism, though they have different attitudes towards it. While proponents of
shareholder value emphasise its wasteful aspects (growth as opposed to efficiency), others are
more taken by the administrative abilities of the class of managers (Chandler 1977). However
all agree on the bias towards growth inherent in the arrangement.
Let us now formalise the argument. We assume that the only two variables, growth and profits,
enter management's and the owners' utility functions. Further we assume that management only
cares about growth and owners only care about profits. Thus we get the following utility
functions UM and UO, for mangers and owners respectively.
) (g U U M =
) (r U UO =
where g investment or growth of the firm
r profitrate
These assumption are certainly unrealistic in their extreme form, but they simplify the
presentation. All that is needed for the argument developed later is that management cares
more about growth than owners.
To analyse the actual levels of growth and profits chosen, one has to take into account the
constraints the firm faces. The two constraints discussed by post-Keynesians are: the finance
constraint and the profit-growth trade off.8
Inside finance and outside finance are different. This is one of the basic assertions of post-
Keynesian economics that has been slowly and painfully rediscovered by neo-classical
economists over the past decades after Miller and Modigliani (1958). Following the principle
of increasing risk, firms are reluctant to accept high leverage rates since a failure will put the
existence of the firm at risk. Banks on the other hand will take current profit and wealth as a
proxy for a firms reliability, and give credit only to firms that are already profitable. For
simplicity assume that banks give loans as a multiple of the profit earned last year. From this it
follows that we can write the amount of investment feasible for a firm as a function of profits.
finance constraint: ) (r g g
FC £ with  0 '> g
Finance is limited by profits minus dividends paid, i.e. retained earnings, and outside finance
which is a positive function of profits. Note that this constraint need not be binding. It tells
how much the firm can possibly invest, not necessarily how much it will invest.
The second fundamental constraint is the growth-profit trade-off. It is assumed that there is
some relevant region where an increase in investment does harm future profits (the fact that
current distributed profits and current investment expenditures are inversely related is trivial).
This can be argued by start up costs of investment or by increasing managerial costs of fast
growth (known as Penrose effect). Though it may not be obvious that growth harms profits,
post-Keynesians and recent literature on shareholder value agree. E.g. a recent OECD
publication reads: "Among the manifestations of this lack of control over management were
the pursuit of market share and growth at the expense of profitability (…)." (OECD 1998, 17;
emphasis added). To be fair, this is not the only manifestation given, but the existence such a
trade off is obviously implied.
Accepting the trade off, we get profits as a function of investment:
profit-growth trade off:  ) (g r r
RG = with  0 '< r9
Again this is a constraint that needs not be binding, but if the only variables that matter to
management are growth and profits, as we will assume below, then the firm will choose a point
inside the constraint only by mistake.
In figure 1 management's indifference curve is horizontal (UM), whereas that of owners' is
vertical (UO). Taking the finance constraint and the growth profit-trade off, the growth rate
desired by management will in general not be feasible. Thus the finance constraint is binding.
The actual growth and profit combination chosen will thus be what we designated as r feasible
and g feasible.
insert figure 1 about here
The post-Keynesian model has been taken as an ahistoric model of the firm by some authors.
While Eichner and Galbraith emphasise the separation of ownership and control, Lavoie argues
that "that there is no need to emphasise that divorce. Whether the owners are still in control or
not is irrelevant: those individuals taking decisions within the firm are in search of power; and
their behaviour and motivations will reflect that fundamental fact." (Lavoie 1992, 101f). This
pursuit of power can only be successful if the firm is big, thus the unambiguous goal of growth.
We disagree with this position, emphasising the need to regard this model of the firm as the
result of specific historic circumstances. The class perspective outlined above indicates that
managers occupy a complex position with potentially contradictory interests. Therefore it is
impossible to define their interests without reference to institutions. Furthermore, rentiers are
underestimated in the managerial model. Rentiers are easily satisfied in this model: "Managers
mitigate the fluctuations of dividends in the attempt to keep the shareholders happy and the
stock market quiet. Managers usually keep constant the level of dividends or have them slowly
increasing, assuming that shareholders do not object to the existing level of dividend payment
or dividend ratio (…)" (Lavoie 1992, 108). Overall, "In the Galbraithian and post-Keynesian
firm, shareholders play a purely passive role" (Lavoie 1992, 107). Again, we insist that rentiers
are unlikely to content themselves to such a passive role voluntarily. Rather it is specific
historic circumstances, of the Golden Age regime where an interventionist state purposefully
restricted the role of finance.10
4. Financialization and management priorities
In the course of the 70s two institutional changes occurred that helped to align management's
interests with shareholders' interests: the development of new financial instruments that
allowed hostile take-overs and changes in the pay structure of managers. Among the former
were tender offers and junk bonds (Baker and Smith 1998), among the latter were performance
related pay schemes and stock options (Lazonick and O'Sullivan 2000). The former play the
role of the stick, the latter is the carrot. Both have proven fairly effective in making
management adopting shareholders' priorities and "profoundly altered patterns of managerial
power and behaviour." (Baker and Smith 1998, 3)
The effects of this development are viewed differently—unsurprisingly, since it represents a
shift in the power structure within the firm. Baker and Smith emphatically welcome that after
the deregulation and changes of the 1970s and 80s "the pendulum could swing back toward
financial capitalism, which would limit managerial discretion in favour of more rigorous
exploitation of corporate resources" (Baker and Smith 1998, 22). Marxists would probably
agree but be more specific in saying "… rigorous exploitation of workers". Lazonick and
O'Sullivan on the other hand write: "In the name of creating 'shareholder value', the past two
decades have witnessed a marked shift in the strategic orientation of top corporate managers in
the allocation of corporate resources and returns away from 'retain and reinvest' and towards
'downsize and distribute'." (Lazonick and O'Sullivan 2000, 18)
Both arguments are consistent with our post-Keynesian theory of the firm. Management has an
ambiguous class position and its interests are therefore sensitive to institutional changes.
Changes in the pay structure as well as the threat of hostile take-overs will make it adopt
shareholders' preferences. In the figure above management's utility function will rotate (U'
instead of U, see figure 2)
insert figure 2 here11
The new chosen growth-profit combination will exhibit higher profits and lower growth (figure
2). In the extreme case of perfect assimilation of managers by shareholder, they will adopt a
vertical indifference curve and chose the profit maximising point. In the new optimal point the
finance constraint is not binding. Firms could grow faster, given their access to finance, but
they choose not to because that would reduce profitability.
If our story were true, one would expect that managers and consequently non-financial
businesses identify increasingly as rentiers and hence will also behave as such. We would
expect higher dividend payout, lower growth and more financial investment of non-financial
businesses. Note that our story avoids assigning the active role exclusively to rentiers and
financial markets. Given the ambiguous class positions of management they may, after initial
changes actively promote and further the shareholder value orientation, as noticed by Lazonick
and O'Sullivan (2000) and Jürgens, Naumann and Rupp (2000).
5. The regression specification
The hypothesis of this paper is that financialization contributed to the slowdown in
accumulation since the Golden Age. As we have argued above, management adopted the
preferences of rentiers in the process of institutional changes of financialization. The
consequence of this is that management and thus non-financial business should become more
rentiers-like, which among other things, means that they have less growth oriented priorities
and invest in financial markets.
In the following sections empirical tests of this hypothesis by means of macroeconomic data
will be presented. This requires some clarification, since the theory presented in the previous
sections was essentially microeconomic. However, the phenomenon that we wish to explain,
i.e. the slowdown of accumulation, is a macroeconomic one. Therefore, one has to be careful
in interpreting the results. We cannot directly estimate the model developed, rather we estimate
an investment function controlling for standard variables and include a proxy for
financialization. The theory part merely provides the analytical basis for adding the
financialization variable.12
As an indicator for financialization we will use the interest and dividend income of the non-
financial business sector divided by its value added, or, as we will henceforth say, the "rentiers
share of non-financial businesses" (RSNF). The numerator of this expression captures the
rentiers income. Note that the "rentiers share of the non-financial business sectors" measures
the receipts from financial investment rather than financial investment itself. Since we defined
classes by income types this is the proper indicator for our purposes.
To isolate the effect of financialization on investment we control for other variables that effect
investment decisions. Thus we include an accelerator term, a profit term and a term for the
relative cost of capital as the standard variables in the literature (see Meyer and Kuh 1957;
Jorgenson 1971; and Chirinko 1993 as surveys). Our  investment equation thus is:
) ; , , ( RSNF CC PS CAPUT f ACCU = (1)




CC relative cost of capital
RSNF rentiers' share of non-financial businesses
This specification is inspired by the reformulation of post-Keynesian investment function by
Marglin and Bhaduri (1990), but contains the neo-classical approach (pioneered by Jorgensen
1963) as a special case. Keynesians argue for the importance demand effects and the role of
profits –as source of internal finance and as proxy for profit expectations- , whereas neo-
classical economists emphasise the role of the relative cost of capital and accept the role of
output.
On the issue of internal finance a certain convergence of Keynesians and neo-classical
economists has occurred in the 1980s, with market imperfections playing an important role in
economic theory and the pioneering empirical work by Fazzari and Hubbard, who showed its
empirical relevance in a series of firm level studies (e.g. Fazzari and Mott 1986; Hubbard,
Kashyap and Whited 1995; see Hubbard 1998 as a survey). Since our empirical tests will refer13
to comparative aggregate business investment, the closest comparable works are Ford and
Poret (1990) from a neo-classical perspective, and Bhaskar and Glyn (1995) and Bowles and
Boyer (1995) from a Post-Keynesian perspective. A detailed comparison with these works will
be given after the presentation of the empirical results.
We expect higher rentiers income of non-financial businesses to have a negative effect on their
accumulation. Note that this is in contrast to the argument of firms being finance constrained
as well as to the argument that financial investment by firms will overall increase efficiency.
According to the first argument the effect should be positive, rentiers income is still income,
after all. According to the second argument we expect a positive effect (if firms that previously
had no finance now have access to finance) or no effect (if only the allocation of investment is
effected). However, we argue that this type of income is an expression of the financialization
and thus has a negative effect on the desired rate of growth.
6. Data sources and econometric issues
The rate of growth of the capital stock (ACCU) is the growth rate of gross business capital
stock. The profit share (PS) is gross profit share in the business sector and capacity utilisation
(CAPUT) is the detrended capital productivity in the business sector. The data are from the
OECD Economic Outlook data set. The cost of capital measure is the (short term) interest rate
times the price index of investment goods divided by the wage costs per worker (all from the
OECD Economic Outlook data set). The "rentiers share of the non-financial business sector"
(RSNF) is the interest and dividend income received by non-financial businesses divided by
their value added. The data were extracted from the Detailed Tables of the OECD National
Accounts. Unfortunately the calculation of these series is possible only for a few countries.
Furthermore the time periods for which we were able to compile the data, differ across
countries.
Plots of ACCU and RSNF can be found below.
insert figure 3 here14
Equation 1 above abstracts from the question of units and the lag structure imposed. Since
virtually all variables employed do exhibit high degrees of autocorrelation—in may cases unit
root tests fail to reject the unit root hypothesis—time series issues have to be taken seriously.
Unit root tests, however, are notorious for their weak power: Any time series with a unit root
can be approximated arbitrarily close by a trend stationary process and vice versa (this has
become known as the "near observational equivalence of trend-and difference stationary
processes" (Christiano and Eichenbaum 1990); summarised as rules 7 and 9 in Campbell and
Perron 1991). Note, that our variables are already defined in growth rates (in the case of
ACCU) or ratios (CAPUT, RSNF, PS). Intuitively, it is implausible that these variables exhibit
a unit root. A difference stationary variable has no fixed mean and is thus free to wander
around. The interval - 5 to +10 probably captures the entire range of values that growth rates
of capital stock have ever taken on, which is highly unprobable for a unit root variable. Thus
we interpret the results as a high degree of autocorrelation rather than as unit roots.
Following the literature (Bhaskar and Glyn 1995; Bowles and Boyer 1995),we will mostly use
partial adjustment models (PAM) in the estimations. To ensure that the results are not
spurious, i.e. caused by spurious correlations between unit root variables, an autoregressive
distributed lag model (ADL) is also estimated. ADL models have been shown to have desirable
properties even in the face of unit roots (Sims, Stock, Watson 1990), they "solve many of the
problems associated with spurious regressions, although tests of some hypotheses will still
involve non-standard distributions." (Hamilton 1994, 562). All explanatory variables are
lagged. In the case of accumulation this is also sensible because of the time lag between
investment decision and investment expenditure. Furthermore it prevents problems of
simultaneity and inverse causation. For example since we use last year's capacity utilisation, it
cannot be influenced by this year's investment.
7. Regression results
We aim at testing one specification for all countries without attempt to optimise the fit for each
country. Thus we abstain from including dummies or other country specific variables. Rather
we examine the sensitivity of the results to changes in the time series specification and their
robustness to changes in the variables. We first present a PAM model and second an ADL
model, which is a more general model. Third we test whether the measure of CAPUT effects15
the results and fourth rentiers income and rentiers payments are included separately. A second
lag of the dependent variable was included in all specifications, because diagnostic tests
indicated the possibility of second order autocorrelation.
t t t t
t t t o t
RSNF CC PS
CAPUT ACCU ACCU ACCU
e b b b
b b b b
+ + + +
+ + + =
- - -
- - -
1 8 1 6 1 4
1 2 2 11 1 1 (2)
Table 1 present the results of this regression of the PAM specification. Most variables have the
expected signs, with two out of the three being significant for each country. Only for the USA
is only one variable, RSNF, significant.
insert table 1 here
Since the regression is in levels and autoregressive terms are included, the R2 are very high
with only the USA below 90%. Autocorrelation is a problem in France and the USA even
though we included two lagged variables. This may reflect missing variables. However, it is not
obvious what these variables would be. Since we are dealing with regression equations where
lagged dependent variables enter on the right hand side, the critical values of the Durbin
Watson statistics are invalid. Instead, the more general Godfrey Breusch test for serial
correlation is used. This test is not restricted to first order autocorrelation.
4
Correlation among explanatory variables, unsurprisingly given that number of variables we
employ, is a problem. Defining high correlation somewhat arbitrarily as a correlation
coefficient higher than .8 (Kennedy 1992, 180), PS is correlated with RSNF and CC in France.
CAPUT and RSNF are correlated in Germany. CAPUT is highly correlated with past ACCU in
both Germany and France. This may inflate the estimated standard errors.
The autoregressive term is statistically significant in three of the four countries. RSNF, our
proxy for financialization, has the expected sign and is statistically significant at the 5% level in
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 The test belongs to the class of asymptotic (large sample) tests known as Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests. Its
null hypothesis is 'no serial correlation'. We will as a standard test for first and second order autocorrelation.
We still report the DW statistics because, even though its critical values do not apply, its value usually gives a
good first idea of how serious autocorrelation problems are.16
two countries (UK, USA) and in France at the 11% level. It has a negative sign and is
statistically insignificant in Germany. The control variables perform modestly well, which is not
unusual for comparative investment regressions (Ford and Poret 1991). CAPUT has the
expected sign three times and is statically significant at the 5% level twice. PS also has the
expected sign three times, but is statistically significant only once. Only CC exhibits the
"wrong" sign three times and is not significant at all.
We also tested whether the results were due to our somewhat unconventional measure of
capacity utilisation. This is clearly not the case. We used the output gap and the rate of growth
of business sector output, both of which confirmed the results that we got with capital
productivity.
Table 2 summarises the regression results of a reparameterized ADL model. It contains all
variables in levels as well as in differences and is intended to check whether the PAM is a
plausible special case of the general ADL.
t t t t t t t
t t t t o t
RSNF RSNF CC CC PS PS
CAPUT CAPUT ACCU ACCU ACCU
e b b b b b b
b b b b b
+ D + + D + + D + +
D + + + + =
- - - - - -
- - - -
1 9 1 8 1 7 1 6 1 5 1 4
1 3 1 2 2 11 1 1 (2)
insert table 2 here
We regard the ADL model as a starting point to narrow down the number of parameters. The
t-values reported are free of spurious correlation problems arising from unit roots. However,
they do suffer from mulitcollinearity since we have ten variables included. The information we
wish to extract from the ADL model is whether the variables should be included in levels or in
differences. With respect to this question, the results are somewhat ambiguous, but strongly
suggestive, if we take the higher t-value as the indicator: T-values are higher for levels rather
than differences for all countries for RSNF, and three times for CAPUT and PS. Only for CC
do we have an indication that differences may be the more appropriate specification, t-values
for differences are higher than for levels three times.17
Compared to the PAM specification the coefficient estimates of RSNF experience, like the
other estimates, a drop in their t-values, but do not vary greatly. They keep their and signs stay
within the same order of magnitude. Thus, the parameter estimates are not due to spurious
regression results.
insert table 3 here
Table 3 reports the results of this regression with output growth of the business sector
(GROWTH) instead of CAPUT and including CC in difference form. Few changes compared
to the earlier regression can be reported. Autocorrelation problems decrease, but are still
present in the USA. Note that output growth performs worse than capacity utilisation. Its
significance is very sensitive to the lags in accumulation. It is significant only in the UK. Other
parameter estimates are hardly affected. CC ceases to be significant in Germany but turns
significant in the UK. RSNF remains highly significant in France and the USA. Therefore the
significance of financialization does not rest on the specification of capacity utilisation.
While we reject second order autocorrelation in this specification for both France and the
USA, we do so by a very thin margin. Since autocorrelation was a persistent problem for these
countries in earlier specifications, we tested whether our findings are related to second order
autocorrelation (First order autocorrelation does not seem to be a problem). A first suspicion is
of course that this indicates missing variables. We therefore experimented with adding more
lagged variables, but this did not cure autocorrelation. Finally we resorted to the rather crude
method of including the second lag of the error of the OLS estimate. This does not effect
significance of the coefficient on RSNF.
From a internal finance point of view it may be surprising that rentiers income should affect
accumulation in a negative way. If firms were finance constrained, it should rather increase
accumulation. This concerns the core of our argument that implies that firms (on average) are
not constrained by finance (profits are high), but their priorities make them choose not to
invest. However, it might be that our measure of financialization, RSNF, is picking up
increased rentiers payments which in fact rose in parallel with rentiers income. To control for
this, we included rentiers payments as well as rentiers income. If the significance of RSNF18
were due to its correlation with payments, we would expect payments to have a negative sign
and RSNF to switch to a positive sign.
insert table 4 here
The results are interesting. RPNF, the rentiers payments (divided by the value added) of the
business sector are not significant, but close to the 10% level in France and the UK, both with
a negative sign, as expected. RSNF does lose significance but keeps its sign in France and the
USA, in both countries being close to the 10% level. It is not overly surprising that none of the
two variables are significant because they are highly correlated (the correlation coefficient is
.75 for Germany and above .9 for all other countries). Note that for both, France and the USA,
the t-value is greater for RSNF than for RPNF. From this we conclude that RSNF does play an
independent role. As in previous specifications autocorrelation problems exist in France and
the USA.
8. Interpretation and comparisons with other investment studies
Leaving aside the question of financialization for a moment, how do these results overall
compare to the existing literature on investment functions? In short, they mostly confirm it.
First, and unfortunately, we confirm that standard variables have problems in explaining
investment and that lagged investment itself may, in fact, explain most of current investment.
Second, and more encouraging, the standard variables do play a role, roughly half of the time
they are significant with the expected sign. Third, and most surprising, the accelerator term
does not perform better than other variables. This, at first sight, contradicts previous findings.
It is due to the that two lags of investment were included. This is consistent with findings by
Ford and Poret (1991). Nonetheless, changes in capacity utilisation still by far explain most of
the short run changes in accumulation. Multiplying the standard deviation of each variable with
the corresponding parameter estimate gives by far the highest value for CAPUT. Fourth, the
importance of past profits is confirmed. Even though the second lag in accumulation also
decreases their significance, internal finance is statistically significant in many specifications.
Fifth, the cost of capital has only a limited influence. Only in one country, Germany, is it
consistently significant, in all others it is not.19
We note the following pattern regarding countries: Germany conforms to the standard model
of investment: capacity, profits and the cost of capital are statistically significant, our variable
of financialization is not. In France the profit share and the rentiers share of non-financial
businesses are consistently significant. In the UK capacity utilisation is significant, and
depending on the specification, the RSNF is too. In particular, including CC in differences
rather than levels has an adverse effect on the significance of RSNF. In the USA, RSNF is the
only consistently significant variable, the profit share is sometimes. Are these findings
consistent with our story on financialization? The lack of significance for Germany certainly is,
since the literature regards Germany as a late comer in the development of shareholder value
and our time series for Germany ends in 1990 (to avoid the statistical problems of unification).
Our tests can hardly be conclusive of our hypothesis that financialization has caused a
reduction in accumulation rates, but they certainly provide strong initial support. The variable
for financialization, RSNF, fares as good as any standard variable in investment regressions. It
is robust to changes in the specification, especially with respect to how we measure capacity
utilisation. However, some caveats apply. There are technical problems like multicollinearity
and some degree of autocorrelation for some countries. However, RSNF remains significant
once autocorrelation is controlled for. But probably more important, the general results of our
investment function are not overwhelming, though certainly not worse than many other
studies. While we may have made some contribution to explaining the recent slowdown in
accumulation, investment remains the bane of empirical macroeconomics.
Finally we want to point out some technical differences to Bhaskar and Glyn (1995) and
Bowles and Boyer (1995), who provide empirical tests of the Marglin-Bhaduri investment
function. All of them adopt a partial adjustment model. Thus there is no difference in the time
series specification,
5
 except for the second lag of the dependent variable. Unlike the previous
literature, we derive the specification from a more general ADL model and test robustness.
Bhaskar and Glyn (1995) also test for cointegration, but this is inappropriate in the context of a
                                               
5
 Bowles and Boyer (1995) do add a time trend, which we do not. Their approach may be appropriate if one is
interested in short run effects. in a more long run analysis, it is hard to interpret the time trend. Unsurprisingly,
Bowles and Boyer do encounter high autocorrelation problems. In most of our specifications a time trend is not
statistically significant and does not effect the significance of RSNF.20
partial adjustment model.
6
 There are some differences in the variables used. Bahskar and Glyn
(1995) use a somewhat different measure of the cost of capital (they adjust for technical
progress via a Solow residual), and Bowles and Boyer (1995) use the employment rate as the
measure of capacity utilisation.
7
 Thus the only substantial difference is that we include a
variable for the rentiers income. 
8
9. The economic significance of financialization
So far we have been concerned with the statistical significance of our measure of
financialization. Next we wish to investigate its economic significance (McCloskey and Ziliak
1996), or in other words: To what extent can we explain the slowdown in accumulation from
the late 1960s to the early 1990s as the result of financialization? To answer this question table
5 below summarises the coefficient estimates for the autoregression of ACCU and the
coefficient estimates for RSNF.
insert table 5 here
Taking the mean from the values above, we can calculate the long run effect of the change in
the rentiers share of non-financial businesses on capital accumulation. The long run effect of a
change in the rentiers share is the regression coefficient divided by one minus the
autoregressive coefficients. Multiplying this by the change in the rentiers share (column
"DRSNF"), we get the explained change in accumulation (column "explained DACCU"), which
                                               
6
 First we have argued that there are theoretical reasons to assume that accumulation is I(0) rather than I(1).
Second, even if accumulation were I(1) testing for cointegration in a partial adjustment model is meaningless:
since an I(1) variable by definition is, technically speaking, cointegrated with its lagged value, i.e. there exists a
linear combination that is I(0), and the partial adjustment model includes a lagged value of the dependent
variable, the resulting error term has to be I(0). Finally they use incorrect critical values (ADF critical values
differ for a unit root test and cointegration tests)
7
 This is motivated by their purpose to estimate the effects of redistribution. Unemployment thus captures the
disciplinary effect of capacity utilization on wages. For our purpose and context, i.e. European unemployment,
this is unacceptable. However, since the slowdown in accumulation changes the link between unemployment
and capacity utilization. Unemployment is therefore a bad measure of capacity.
8
 In terms of the Marglin-Bhaduri model this represents a shift variable for autonomous investment
expenditures. Thus, our results regarding financialization suggest an interpretation of the end of the Golden
Age that differs from the one given by Marglin and Bhaduri (1990) themselves. Rather than adverse changes in
the profit and capacity sensitivity of investment demand, the financialization story suggest a decease in
autonomous investment.21
we contrast with the actual change in accumulation (column "actual DACCU"). The changes
refer to the differences between the average of the period 1964-74 and of the period 1985-94
(or the closest value we had).
insert table 6 here
Unsurprisingly, this value varies greatly between countries. For Germany, where most
coefficient estimates for RSNF were positive, we calculate a positive contribution to
accumulation. For France we explain almost the entire slowdown in accumulation. The UK is
the only country where there was no slowdown in accumulation. Note that our "explained
DACCU" for the UK is about as high as for France. Thus even though the coefficient estimates
for UK were not statistically significant, they are economically significant, i.e. if the point
estimates were correct, RSNF would have a strong impact on accumulation. In the USA we
roughly explain a third of the reduction in accumulation. Taking the mean of the various
coefficients for individual countries, we explain the entire slowdown of accumulation from the
late 1960s to the late 1980s (as can be seen by comparing the columns explained and actual
DACCU).
Thus while on the average, the story that increased financial investment caused the slowdown
in accumulation can be substantiated, our calculations for individual countries vary in
plausibility. The calculations certainly do confirm that financialization potentially played an
important role in reducing investment.
Conclusion
The paper developed and tested a theory arguing that financialization leads to a slowdown in
accumulation. By means of an elaboration on earlier post-Keynesian theories of the firms, we
showed how the "shareholder revolution", i.e. the development of a market for corporate
control and the reorientation of management priorities along the lines of creating shareholder
value, leads to a reduction in the growth rate desired by firms. Managers have various goals in
running a firm, in particular growth is an intrinsic goal and maximising profits is not the
exclusive goal, whereas shareholders will exclusively be interested in profits. Bodies of22
literature as diverse as business history (Chandler), post-Keynesians (Galbraith, Eichner) and
recent management literature (Baker and Smith) agree on these stylised facts, implying that the
firm faces a trade off between growth and profits. The shareholder revolution included a
market for corporate control, i.e. the possibility of firing managers, and performance related
pay schemes. These institutional changes will lead managers to adopt management policy
closer to shareholders' preferences, i.e. profitability will gain in weight relative to growth. If the
firm in fact faces a trade off between profits and growth, this translates into lower investment
activity.
The empirical tests were performed with annual data for the business sector for Germany,
France, UK, and the USA. The findings show some support for the hypothesis that
financialization caused a slowdown in accumulation. We found full support for our hypothesis
in the USA and France, some support in the UK, but none in Germany. Financialization
occurred in the UK, but there is no general slowdown in accumulation because the UK already
had very low accumulation rates in the Golden Age. The insignificant findings for Germany are
consistent with our story, since the literature indicates that shareholder value orientation is a
very new phenomenon in Germany. We did perform tests for robustness and experimented
with the lag structure. The results are robust.
We conclude that financialization is likely to have the effects implied by our theory, but further
research is needed to confirm the findings. On a macroeconomic level, a systems approach
would be desirable to endogenize capacity utilisation and on a microeconomic level it would be
fruitful to test our underlying model, e.g. one could control for factors like the pay scheme of
managers. Nonetheless, if our parameter estimates come close the actual effects this has strong
implications. For France financialization explains the entire slowdown in accumulation, for the
USA about on third of the slowdown. Financialization therefore can potentially explain an
economically significant part of the slowdown in accumulation.
Our analysis does not lend itself to straightforward policy conclusions, rather it suggests that
changes on financial markets and organisational structures in the firm have to be discussed
simultaneously. Regulation of financial markets and the empowerment of growth interested
groups within the firm should go hand in hand. But organisational changes will take time.23
Therefore, if investment is to be increased in the short run, public investment may be a more
effective way to do so.
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Table 1 Regression results: partial adjustment model
Germany France UK USA
period 63-90 78-97 70-96 63-97
C -0.09 ** -0.03 -0.03 0.01
-2.44 -0.40 -1.96 0.14
CAPUT-1 0.19 ** 0.09 0.16 *** -0.04
1.98 0.37 3.43 -0.67
PS-1 0.001 ** 0.001 0.000 0.002
2.00 1.13 -0.08 1.63
RSNF-1 0.13 -0.21 -0.22 ** -0.37 ***
0.40 -1.71 -2.38 -3.67
CC-1 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
-1.43 -1.25 -0.70 0.04
ACCU-1 0.72 *** 0.68 0.93 *** 0.84 ***
3.07 1.52 5.19 3.48
ACCU-2 -0.25 * -0.05 -0.17 -0.40 **
-1.69 -0.19 -0.90 -2.69
R-squared 0.96 0.94 0.90 0.82
Adjusted R-
squared
0.95 0.91 0.88 0.79
GB Obs. R2 1.08 6.02 * .89 6.55 **29
Table 2 Regression results: ADL model
Germany France UK USA
period 63-90 79-97 71-96 63-97
Const -0.13 0.01 -0.03 -0.04
-2.79 0.04 -1.33 -0.61
ACCU-1 0.85 *** 0.33 0.96 *** 0.71 ***
2.50 0.49 4.30 2.65
ACCU-2 -0.60 * 0.31 -0.09 -0.37
-1.89 0.64 -0.38 -1.42
CAPUT-1 0.31 ** -0.01 0.14 ** 0.07
2.36 -0.02 2.32 0.72
DCAPUT-1 -0.153 0.195 0.182 0.039
-0.82 0.56 1.36 0.39
PS-1 0.001 * 0.001 0.000 0.001
1.84 0.91 -0.37 0.48
DPS-1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.33 -0.44 0.26 0.99
RSNF-1 0.36 -0.31 -0.16 -0.30 *
0.77 -1.57 -1.09 -1.91
D RSNF-1 -0.13 0.19 0.03 0.39
-0.27 0.83 0.23 1.06
CC-1 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001
-0.62 -1.20 0.79 0.89
D CC-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 *
-0.78 0.41 -1.25 -1.72
R-squared 0.97 0.94 0.93 0.86
Adjusted R-squared 0.95 0.86 0.88 0.79
GB Obs. R2 2.45 6.63 ** .61 6.72 **
Calculations performed with Eviews. Italic numbers are t-values.
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.30
Table.3 Regression specification with output growth
Germany France UK USA
period 63-90 78-97 70-96 63-97
const -0.03 * -0.02 0.00 0.01
-1.85 -1.67 -0.03 0.40
GROWTH-1 -0.01 0.02 0.08 ** 0.08
-0.11 0.31 2.52 1.24
PS-1 0.0012 ** 0.0011 ** 7.E-05 0.000
2.42 2.38 0.10 0.24
RSNF-1 -0.22 -0.32 *** -0.04 -0.22 ***
-0.83 -2.66 -0.34 -2.45
DCC-1 -0.0004 0.0004 -0.0003 ** -0.001
-1.12 0.61 -1.71 -1.47
ACCU-1 1.13 *** 0.49 1.18 *** 0.75
4.26 1.13 6.63 3.09
ACCU-2 -0.36 0.18 -0.28 -0.22
-1.60 0.52 -1.45 -0.99
R2 0.96 0.93 0.89 0.84
adj R2 0.94 0.90 0.85 0.80
BG Obs. R2 2.16 4.11 1.1 4.4531
Table.4 Regression including rentiers payments
Germany France UK USA
period 63-90 78-97 70-96 63-97
const -0.11 *** -0.02 -0.06 *** 0.00
-2.71 -0.31 -3.66 -0.05
CAPUT-1 0.25 ** 0.03 0.20 *** -0.01
2.26 0.14 4.01 -0.23
PS-1 0.0013 0.0012 ** 0.0003 0.0012
1.21 2.88 0.60 1.04
RPNF-1 -0.03 -0.11 -0.14 0.08
-0.22 -1.47 -1.44 0.35
RSNF-1 0.20 -0.23 0.04 -0.41
0.65 -1.62 0.21 -1.40
D CC-1 -0.0007 ** 0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0006
-2.22 0.94 -1.67 -1.20
ACCU-1 0.82 *** 0.32 0.85 *** 0.95 ***
3.55 0.59 4.64 4.60
ACCU-2 -0.47 *** 0.26 -0.06 -0.46 ***
-2.81 0.82 -0.29 -2.95
R2 0.97 0.94 0.92 0.83
Adj R2 0.95 0.91 0.89 0.79
GB Obs R2 1.32 8.25 ** 2.57 6.69 **32
Table.5 Summary of the coefficients on the lagged dependent variable and RSNF from various
specifications
France Germany UK USA
autoregressive terms of ACCU
ADL .64 .25 .85 .34
PAM .7 .35 .73 .41
with growth .67 .77 .9 .53
mean 0.67 0.46 0.83 0.44
coefficient on RSNF
ADL -.31 .36 -.16 -.3
PAM -.33 .13 -.15 -.31
with growth -.32 -.22 -.04 -.22
mean -0.32 0.09 -0.12 -0.2733
Table.6 Explaining the slowdown in accumulation
reg coeff autoreg
coeff






RSNF b ACCU b RSNF b
Germany 0.09 0.46 0.015 0.17 0.002 -0.021
France -0.32 0.67 0.026 -0.97 -0.025 -0.027
UK -0.12 0.83 0.034 -0.71 -0.024 0.005
USA -0.28 0.43 0.015 -0.49 -0.007 -0.023
mean -0.24 0.64 0.025 -0.67 -0.017 -0.015
Note. D RSNF and DACCU are the difference between average rates 65-74 and 85-94.